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Orchestrating Equity
What Antidiscrimination Law Can Learn
from Blind Hiring in American Orchestras

Stephen F. Marino
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Orchestrating Equity
What Antidiscrimination Law Can Learn from Blind Hiring in American Orchestras
Major American orchestras are unique in their hiring practices. Employment decisions
for orchestra musicians are based almost solely on an audition, which is typically conducted
“blindly,” meaning a curtain visually separates the candidate from the judges. This practice was
originally implemented as a means to limit gender bias in orchestra hiring—so that the hiring
committee would not be able to tell whether a candidate was male or female. With regard to
increasing gender diversity in orchestras, implementing blind auditions is largely seen as having
contributed to a significant rise in the number of women hired as orchestral musicians. But,
while gender diversity has significantly increased, racial demographics in orchestras remain
largely static, and largely nondiverse.
In a widely-discussed and widely-criticized July 2020 editorial, Anthony Tommasini,
Chief Classical Music Critic of the New York Times, called for an end to the practice of blind
auditions, arguing that if racial diversity is ever to increase in the American orchestra, blind
auditions must be eliminated. Tommasini does not provide a clear alternative to the blind
audition, but implies that some sort of affirmative action may be necessary, and/or that for some
reason, whether a lack of qualifications as defined in the traditional sense or structural biases
and barriers to accessing the hiring process, minority candidates are not winning orchestra
auditions. And although neither Tommasini nor the broader industry seems to have a well-settled
or uniform solution, the proposal provides an interesting angle from which to analyze the
diversity problem in orchestral music, and how potential solutions interact with
antidiscrimination law.
This comment seeks to address the various factors that may contribute to this lack of
diversity: the practice of blind auditions, a lack of training for minority candidates, cost and time

barriers to pursuing professional auditions, and biases built in to the typical assessment criteria.
Each of these implicate distinct facets of antidiscrimination law and present different challenges
both with respect to furthering diversity initiatives and complying with the law. Additionally, this
comment analyzes the potential merits of a Title VII disparate impact suit that could be brought
by an orchestra candidate.
Analyzing the difficulties in bringing such a suit—particularly in overcoming business
necessity and First Amendment defenses—illustrates how in a highly skilled, highly competitive
field, Title VII does little to further its original goal of increasing equal employment
opportunities. These issues are not unique to the orchestral world. While the unique hiring
structure in this field provides an interesting and isolated perspective from which to analyze
unintentional discrimination in the audition process, it also illustrates broader issues with many
antidiscrimination law ideas including debiasing, the antisubordination vs. anticlassification
distinction, and the legal viability of affirmative action. These lessons can be applied to virtually
any hiring context. And in analyzing the viability of a disparate impact suit, this comment also
seeks to highlight the shortcomings in Title VII, one of the most important pieces of legislation in
U.S. history. Today, it is much rarer for racial minority candidates to face overt hiring
discrimination, as compared to 1964. But, statistics are clear that unintentional discrimination is
still prevalent in many fields, including orchestras. This comment will explore how despite the
clear disparate impact in orchestral hiring, Title VII may lack the ability to combat
discrimination where it is most needed today: where discrimination is hard to detect or where
the discriminator either lacks intent to discriminate or does so in subtle or structural ways.
Finally, this comment seeks to explore how the same First Amendment principles that
could undermine a potential Title VII suit can also potentially give orchestras much greater
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leeway in implementing affirmative action should they choose to do so. While classifying
orchestras’ hiring processes and decisions as expression means that any disparities the hiring
process creates are likely shielded by the First Amendment, that same First Amendment
protection may protect potential voluntary affirmative action plans from an otherwise
challenging legal landscape shaped by cases like Johnson and Weber.

I.

Background
American orchestras are struggling to diversify the orchestral musician workforce.1

Historically, candidates hired as full-time musicians in major American orchestras were almost
entirely white and male.2 With the implementation of a practice known as the “blind audition”
beginning in the 1970s, orchestras began to gradually rectify gender disparities among their
musicians.3 Today, women are hired as orchestra musicians at an equal, if not greater, rate
compared to men.4 However, racial disparities persist in orchestras’ hiring processes.5 As one
classical music critic notes, “[the orchestral] world is blindingly white, both in its history and its
present.”6 As this issue draws increasing public attention, various programs, initiatives, and
1

Aaron Flagg, Anti-Black Discrimination in American Orchestras, SYMPHONY, Summer 2020, at 30-37 (“the
orchestra field has [historically] been branded as being by and for white men[, but] the field by and large wants to
dismantle the impact of systematic discrimination ….”); Michael Cooper, Seeking Orchestras in Tune With Their
Diverse Communities, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018) (describing that “[o]rchestras are among America’s least racially
diverse institutions. African-American musicians accounted for only 1.8 percent of the nation’s orchestra players in
2014”); Anthony Tommasini, To Make Orchestras More Diverse, End Blind Auditions, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2020)
(“Hanging on to a system that has impeded diversity is particularly conspicuous at a moment when the country has
been galvanized by revulsion to police brutality against Black Americans — and when orchestras, largely shuttered
by the coronavirus pandemic, are brainstorming both how to be more relevant to their communities and how to
redress racial inequities among their personnel when they re-emerge.”).
2
Flagg, supra note 1, at 31; Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind"
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV., no. 4, Sept. 2000, at 715.
3
Goldin & Rouse, supra note 2.
4
Id.
5
See, e.g., Flagg, supra note 1; Tommasini, Blind Auditions, supra note 1; Alex Ross, Black Scholars Confront
White Supremacy in Classical Music, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 14, 2020).
6
Ross, supra note 5.
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proposals aimed at addressing these disparities have been attempted or considered. They include
forms of affirmative action, changing audition and hiring procedures, legal proceedings alleging
racial discrimination, and educational initiatives to foster minority talent. This comment will
explore the distinct legal and practical challenges associated with each.
A. The Race Problem in American Orchestras
Today, there is an extreme racial imbalance in American orchestras. According to a 2014
study “only 1.8 percent of the players in top [orchestras] were Black; just 2.5 percent were
Latino.”7 As a point of comparison, Black and Latino persons comprised 11.4% and 7.4% of the
total U.S. workforce in 2014, respectively.8 While many highly skilled or specialized professions
are criticized for a lack of diversity, the disparity is particularly stark among professional
orchestra musicians. Diversity among professional orchestra musicians lags drastically behind
other professional groups, even many groups similarly criticized for having nondiverse
workforces like medical doctors,9 attorneys,10 and actors.11
American orchestras have increasingly drawn criticism for this lack of diversity, and for
not reflecting the communities they seek to serve.12 Relevance to the surrounding community is a
7

Tommasini, supra note 1; Flagg, supra note 1, at 31. See also Cooper, supra note 1 (noting that at the time of the
2014 study, the percentage of Black musicians had been static for almost a decade). See also Sameer Rao, Inside the
Battle to Diversify Orchestras, One Costly Audition at a Time, COLORLINES (Dec. 27, 2018, 2:56 PM) (“Black
musicians made up just under 2 percent of orchestra musicians but were 12 percent of the U.S. population. Latinx
people comprised 17 percent of the overall populace but only 2.5 percent of orchestra players. … [A]t 9 percent,
Asian orchestra musicians exceeded their U.S. population of 1 percent.”)
8
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 2014 (Nov.
2015).
9
Diversity in Medicine: Facts and Figures 2019, ASS’N AM. MED. COLLS. (Black and Latino medical doctors made
up 5% and 5.8% of the total US workforce in 2018).
10
Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer Population 15% Higher Than 10 Years Ago, New ABA Data Shows, ABA
JOURNAL (May 3, 2018, 2:31 PM) (Black and Latino attorneys each made up 5% of the total US workforce in 2018).
11
Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95
CAL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007).
12
Tommasini, supra note 1 (noting that “American orchestras remain among the nation’s least racially diverse
institutions” and “[i]f ensembles are to reflect the communities they serve, the audition process should take into
account race, gender and other factors.”).
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particularly important business concern for modern orchestras as they struggle to stay solvent
while “largely shuttered” by the pandemic. Accordingly, Tommasini argues that “[h]anging on to
a system that has impeded diversity” may no longer be part of a viable business model.13
Orchestras have also failed to make progress on racial diversity where other professions
have, illustrated by the fact that the New York Philharmonic, the oldest and arguably finest
American orchestra, has the same number of Black musicians in its 106-musician complement as
it had in 1969: one.14 Prominent musicians have additionally noted the importance of
representation in the field for the industry’s long-term diversity and viability.15
Although a lack of racial diversity still plagues American orchestras, many have, to
varying degrees, recognized the issue and considered remedial action. For example, in 2018, the
League of American Orchestras launched an “equity, diversity, and inclusion” (EDI) initiative,
recognizing EDI’s importance to long-term viability and relevance of orchestral institutions.16
B. Historical Issues
While diversity problems in American orchestras have lately drawn renewed attention,
the issue has long been discussed. In July 1969, during the Civil Rights Movement, two Black
musicians, Arthur Davis and Earl Madison, challenged the New York Philharmonic’s hiring
practices as discriminatory before the New York City Commission on Human Rights.17 In
response to the allegations, groups including the National Urban League “called on the orchestra

13

Id.
Id.
15
See id. (profiling Anthony McGill, the sole Black member of the New York Philharmonic, and noting his
perspective on representation in the field).
16
LEAGUE OF AM. ORCHESTRAS, EQUITY, DIVERSITY, AND INCLUSION: AN EVOLVING STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
(January 18, 2019)
17
Daniel J. Wakin, Mahler Said What to Whom?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2011); Tommasini, supra note 1.
14
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to put affirmative action in place.”18 Ultimately, the Commission concluded that the
Philharmonic had not discriminated against Madison and Davis because they were simply
unqualified for the positions they sought, but nonetheless determined that the orchestra “had
‘engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination’ regarding the hiring of substitute and extra
musicians: an old-boy system that usually relied on the students of players.”19 In its defense, the
Philharmonic denied that it had discriminated, and emphasized the purely meritocratic character
of its hiring processes.20
Despite being found not to have discriminated against Davis and Madison, the racial
disparity in the Philharmonic was stark. The Philharmonic, and orchestras more broadly,
recognized that their public image needed some help.21 At the time, like many of its peer
institutions, the Philharmonic had only one Black musician.22 In seeking to diversify, the
Philharmonic conducted “an almost frantic search for black candidates,” compiling a seven-page
list of candidates and inviting many for special auditions.23 The Philharmonic’s management also
received correspondence urging it to “refute charges of discrimination” by hiring a “young black
violinist.”24
Against the backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement, the movement to diversify
orchestras had support from some of the era’s leading musical figures.25 The Philharmonic’s

18

Wakin, supra note 17.
Id.; Tommasini, Blind Auditions, supra note 1 (hiring extra or substitute musicians was considered discriminatory,
and “old boys’ network”).
20
AMYAS AMES, REPORT TO SUBSCRIBERS, Special Files: Racial Discrimination Charges, Nov 5, 1969 - Nov 5,
1969 (ID: 009-01-05), N.Y. Philharmonic Leon Levy Digital Archives,
https://archives.nyphil.org/index.php/artifact/e488c5d9-8f55-4178-a783-dbc05ef9441c0.1/fullview#page/1/mode/2up.
21
Tommasini, supra note 1 (“The ruling helped prod American orchestras, finally, to try and deal with the biases
that had kept them overwhelmingly white and male.”).
22
Wakin, supra note 17 (at the time of the article in, there were no black musicians in the New York Philharmonic).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
19
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then-Music Director and globally esteemed conductor, composer, and performer, Leonard
Bernstein, was a vocal supporter of both the Civil Rights Movement and increasing diversity in
the music industry.26 Other prominent musicians also supported this movement.27 More broadly,
Congress intended to diversify workforces through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and much of
the Court’s contemporaneous jurisprudence recognized the legitimacy of those goals.28
C. The Blind Audition
Racial imbalances are not the only diversity problem orchestras have historically faced.
Gender imbalances were prevalent until the last couple of decades.29 In an effort to diversify
their workforces and hire more women, orchestras began to institute a new hiring system in the
1970s: so-called “blind” auditions.30 Gender diversity has since increased significantly.31 Racial
diversity still lags far behind.32
The key feature of the blind audition is a screen or curtain, which is used to visually
conceal the candidate from the hiring committee.33 The candidates thus become anonymized and
de-identified, and are referred to simply by a gender-nonspecific number.34 Candidate anonymity
is taken so seriously that the personnel manager often rolls out a small carpet to conceal the

26

See, e.g., id.; Transcript of Record at 53, Madison v. Philharmonic Symphony Soc’y of N.Y., Volume VI: Human
Rights Commission Hearings, Testimony of Bernstein, Sep 29, 1969–Sep 29, 1969, N.Y. Philharmonic Leon Levy
Digital Archives, https://archives.nyphil.org/index.php/artifact/b9dcfa41-0472-4839-8357-07255dbc0a5e0.1/fullview#page/53/mode/1up; Leonard Bernstein, The Negro in Music, Problems He Has to Face In Getting a
Start, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1947, at 253.
27
Flagg, supra note 1, at 37.
28
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
29
E.g., Goldin & Rouse, supra note 2, at 715-20.
30
See Goldin & Rouse, supra note 2.; Tommasini, Blind Auditions, supra note 1 (explaining that the New York
Philharmonic and other large orchestras began to hold blind auditions to minimize racial and gender biases).
31
E.g., Goldin & Rouse, supra note 2 (50% increase); Tommasini, supra note 1 (“Blind auditions, as they became
known, proved transformative. … Today, women make up a third of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, and they are
half the New York Philharmonic.”).
32
See supra Part I.A.
33
See Goldin & Rouse, supra note 2, at 720-24.
34
Id.
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sounds of a candidate’s footsteps and corresponding inferences about the candidate’s sex, or
alternatively asking a female candidate to take off her shoes while he or she provides
“compensating footsteps” that are identical for each candidate.35
Orchestra auditions typically feature multiple rounds, with the candidate pool narrowed at
each stage.36 The preliminary and semifinal rounds are typically blind.37 The final round is
sometimes, but not universally, blind.38 These auditions are very important with regard to the
overall makeup of the orchestra as well as individual musicians’ careers because once a
candidate wins the audition, they are awarded tenure for life in the orchestra, after a brief
probationary period.39
Not only do the results of each individual audition have a high degree of permanence, but
the audition procedures themselves reinforce this permanence as they are generally written into
union contracts.40 Musicians’ unions could pose a barrier to eliminating blind auditions. Unions
were segregated until 1974 and have largely supported the practice as the fairest way to
administer hiring. Given the recent push for diversity, union members may be willing to
reconsider structural barriers that impede diversity. However, the elimination of blind auditions
is far from a sure proposal. Other considerations, too, are often used to justify blind auditions.41
The traditional argument in favor of blind auditions is that they are a pure meritocracy:
because no candidate can be personally identified, there can be no bias against any candidate’s

35

Id.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. See also Desmond Charles Sergeant & Evangelos Himonides, Orchestrated Sex: The Representation of Male
and Female Musicians in World-Class Symphony Orchestras, 10 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY 1, 4 (2019) (“It is
common … for the successful candidate to be hired solely on the evidence of the audition: the player judged to be
the best performer gets the post.”).
40
Goldin & Rouse, supra note 2, at 9; Tommasini, supra note 1 (“Musicians’ unions[] … have long been tenacious
defenders of blind auditions”).
41
Goldin & Rouse, supra note 2.
36
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personal characteristics, and accordingly any judgements the audition committee makes are
purely on the merits of a candidate’s performance because “[t]he screen permits us to focus on
the pure trait of musicianship ….” 42 This “blind audition meritocracy” reinforces the idea that
“[a]n orchestra should be built from the very best players, period.”43 Significant empirical
support exists for this position, as “[r]esearch shows that female musicians are scored higher
when judges cannot tell they are female.”44
D. Proposed Reforms
Amidst rapidly growing social movements, the classical music community has
recognized a need to change and diversify.45 This push comes both from orchestra boardrooms as
well as musicians, press, and nonprofits.46
One criticism and possible area for improvement is the talent pool from which orchestras
draw their players. This argument posits that there simply are not enough qualified players of
color in the labor market for them to be significantly represented on stage. This view implicates
the question of how to define the relevant labor market, what standards candidates should be
judged upon, and whether there are unreasonable barriers for racially diverse candidates to be
competitive for these jobs in ways unrelated to their qualifications.

42

Tommasini, supra note 1 (noting among other things that they were first implemented to address discriminatory
biases and that defenders of blind auditions “assert[] that they are the best way to ensure fairness.”). See also Nancy
Leong, The Race-Neutral Workplace of the Future, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 720 (2017); Robert Post,
Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2000)
(describing the meritocracy argument in terms of functional rationality and explaining that while “[t]he screen
permits us to focus on the pure trait of musicianship,” this “instrumentalization of persons” has both distinct benefits
and limitations).
43
Tommasini, supra note 1.
44
Leong, supra note 43, at 722.
45
See, e.g., LEAGUE OF AMERICAN ORCHESTRAS, EQUITY, DIVERSITY, AND INCLUSION: AN EVOLVING STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK (Jan. 18, 2019).
46
See, e.g., Flagg, supra note 1; Tommasini, supra note 1.
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Another proposal is to critically reassess the actual hiring processes for the orchestra
musicians themselves, as this will have a more direct and immediate effect. This could come in
the form of broadening the candidate pool to include qualified individuals from more diverse
backgrounds, redefining the standards upon which candidates are judged, or instituting some
form of affirmative action.
One of the more controversial recent proposals is a call to end blind auditions.47
Tommasini recognizes the reality that the blind audition system has done little to further racial
diversity, and asserts that “[i]f things are to change, ensembles must be able to take proactive
steps to address the appalling racial imbalance that remains in their ranks[].” “Blind auditions are
no longer tenable,” Tommasini writes, but does not suggest a specific alternative practice.48
Tommasini implies that affirmative action of some kind is necessary, and also seems to suggest,
perhaps problematically, that minority musicians cannot win on the merits, at least as we
currently define them.49 Regardless, a proposal to eliminate blind auditions presents interesting
legal questions because it would strip away the practice’s primary benefit of de-identification,
potentially reintroducing biases (though not necessarily harmful biases) into the selection
process. Such proposals may also run afoul of the Court’s complicated affirmative action
doctrine.50
II.

Challenging Hiring Processes under Title VII

47

How to Diversify Orchestras, Opinion, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2020) (letters from readers in reaction to
Tommasini’s Blind Auditions); Tommasini, supra note 1.

49

Diversify Orchestras, supra note 47.
Another common initiative is “facial” or top-down casting and hiring. It has become commonplace for orchestras
to advertise programs that feature prominent composers, soloists, and conductors of color. While such approaches
lend visibility to racially diverse musicians, they do very little (at least in the short term) to address the particular
problem discussed in this comment: the actual makeup of the orchestra. Thus, these initiatives will not be analyzed
in this comment.

50
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Scholars, commentators, and musicians alike have long lauded the blind audition for its
meritocratic value. Legal scholars, in particular, have touted the blind audition as a valuable form
of debiasing technology for its effects on gender diversity in orchestras, and applied those
lessons to arguments about antidiscrimination law in other contexts. And while scholars and
observers have acknowledged the downsides associated with the blind audition, it has often been
used to bolster arguments in favor of other debiasing mechanisms, such as blind resume review,
without due weight to the adverse effects associated with stripping away elements of an
individual’s identity.
This comment will walk through a hypothetical Title VII disparate impact suit brought by
a candidate for a performing role in an orchestra, as well as potential employer- or communityinitiated solutions to combat this diversity problem including educational initiatives, changes in
recruitment, and various forms of affirmative action. The comment will analyze the various
defenses available in these types of Title VII suits, chiefly the business necessity defense and a
First Amendment defense. In so doing, we will undertake an analysis of the qualities—musical,
professional, and identity-based—that orchestra-employers can, and possibly should, consider in
hiring musicians, and the legal implications and theoretical justifications for considering each of
those aspects.
In structuring this argument through the lens of a potential Title VII suit challenging
current audition practices or future affirmative action plans, this comment also seeks to illustrate
where current Title VII jurisprudence falls short of Congress’s goal of creating equal
employment opportunity.
A. The Title VII Disparate Impact Claim

11

Adversely affected minority job candidates can challenge a potentially discriminatory
hiring system through a Title VII lawsuit. Title VII allows plaintiffs to bring “disparate impact”
challenges to employment practices that are facially neutral but fall more harshly on one group
than another, as long as those practices cannot be justified by business necessity. Unlike many
other antidiscrimination laws, Title VII’s disparate impact provision does not require plaintiffs to
show an employer’s discriminatory intent to impose liability.51
In the orchestral field, where hiring musicians is done blindly, a cause of action without
an intent element is essentially a necessary prerequisite to bringing a discrimination claim, as it is
nearly impossible for a plaintiff to prove an employer’s discriminatory intent, and similarly
difficult for employers to discriminate against candidates on the basis of race when they do not
know candidates’ identities.52

51

Nonetheless, “[t]he distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically dominate in disparate impact cases
do not imply that the ultimate legal issue is different than in cases where disparate treatment analysis [which
requires a showing of intent] is used.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988). It would be
improper to “hold a defendant liable for unintentional discrimination . …Rather, the necessary premise of the
disparate impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive,
may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.” Id. (emphasis added). Although it may
seem counterintuitive to allow a cause of action against employers that does not include an explicit intent element, it
is helpful to consider the national debate over civil rights and equal employment opportunity at the time Title VII
was passed. Civil rights leaders did not focus on intentional, “blatantly exclusionary bars” as the primary barrier to
equal employment opportunity, rather were adamant about “eliminat[ing] other exclusionary impediments” that
impede the development of racially diverse workforces to “reverse a long legacy of structural exclusion.”51 Courts
have carefully specified that Title VII does not “guarantee a job to every person regardless of qualifications[,]” nor
does it “command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because
he is a member of a minority group.” But, Title VII does require “the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
other impermissible classification.” The Title VII disparate impact action was codified in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in
order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.” See Pub. L. No. 102-166.
52
In some cases, a candidate may be deductively identifiable. Consider LEONARD SLATKIN, CLASSICAL
CROSSROADS: THE PATH FORWARD FOR MUSIC IN THE 21ST CENTURY, ch. “On Diversity” (forthcoming Sept. 2021)
(on file with author) (“[T]he people on the audition committee typically include those who are in the section in
question. So if you have a vacancy for first flute, and the second flute of the orchestra tries out for the position, the
committee automatically knows that this colleague is auditioning. … [T]hat person is supposed to be in the hall
listening and is not there, so logically the panel assumes that this musician is one of the candidates playing. Add to
that the members of the orchestra who are usually advanced straight to the finals, and chances are that most jury
personnel can figure out when that particular musician is playing. As trained professionals who have rehearsed and
performed together over a number of seasons, they know how their musical colleagues sound.”).
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In a Title VII disparate impact claim, plaintiffs must first show that a specific practice has
a significant, adverse effect on a protected class. If plaintiffs make this prima facie case, the
employer must then satisfy the burden of persuasion that the challenged practice is related to job
performance and consistent with business necessity.53 Should the employer successfully make a
business necessity defense, plaintiffs have an opportunity to show that an alternative practice
would meet the business objectives without adverse impact.54 In orchestral hiring, the adverse
effect requirement is readily satisfied by statistics that show minority musicians are grossly
underrepresented in the workforce. However, it may be harder to identify the specific practice
causing or contributing to this disparity. A few specific practices could form the basis for a
disparate impact claim, either collectively or standing alone.
One possibility is that the entire audition process is the specific discriminatory practice,
either broadly or because auditions are typically conducted blindly. It may be impossible for a
plaintiff to show how, specifically, these practices contribute to the disparity as required by Title
VII, because of the opacity of the decisionmaking process. But Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
provides helpful guidance on Title VII’s goals, noting that “practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”55 Even if a specific practice cannot
be linked to existing disparities, courts recognize a “bottom line exception” which allows
statistical evidence to prove that employment practices, collectively, lead to impermissible
discrimination.56

53

See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166.
See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)
55
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
56
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166.
54
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In a world where the New York Philharmonic has the same number of Black musicians in
2021 that it had in 1969,57 statistics illustrate that the “status quo” has been effectively frozen.
Importantly, the status quo need not be intentionally discriminatory for the disparities it sustains
to violate Title VII. A more complex question is whether the hiring practices preceding the
implementation of blind auditions were actually discriminatory. On those same statistics, one
might assume that the disparities that existed prior to the gradual implementation of blind
auditions in the 1970s were discriminatory because, just like the disparities that exist today,
racial minorities were dramatically underrepresented earlier in the 20th century as compared to
the broader population. Alternatively, it may be productive to analogize to the statistical change
in gender diversity following the introduction of blind auditions. The dramatic shift toward
gender equality after orchestras adopted blind auditions suggests that prior hiring and audition
and hiring procedures were in fact biased and discriminatory against women. Gender
discrimination is distinct from racial discrimination, and because blind auditions helped one
group and not the other, it may be inaccurate to claim that the practices in place prior to 1970
were also racially discriminatory on those grounds alone. However, the backdrop of the Civil
Rights Movement, the 1970 New York City Commission on Human Rights ruling that thenexisting orchestral hiring policies constituted a “pattern and practice of discrimination[,]” and the
stark statistical disparities that exist today create at least a plausible suggestion that racial animus
has traditionally been a factor in orchestral hiring. Still, in a disparate impact claim, racial
discrimination can be proven without any showing of racial animus—the two concepts are not
inseparably linked.

57

Tommasini, supra note 1.
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Even so, potential plaintiffs must grapple with the reality that blind auditions helped
remedy gender discrimination, but not racial discrimination. Thus, employers can argue that the
blind audition system creates a pure meritocracy: a system that selects the best musician without
regard to race, gender, or any other protected characteristic; in which candidates are judged
completely and exclusively on their ability to perform the job they seek. Employers may then
conclude that this bias-free hiring scheme can only indicate that there are simply not enough
qualified, minority musicians for these racial disparities not to exist. If these points are true,
orchestras may have a powerful “business necessity defense.”
B. The Business Necessity Defense
“Business necessity” is the principal defense available to employers in Title VII disparate
impact cases. To prevail on a business necessity defense, the employer must show that the
challenged practice is related to job performance and consistent with business necessity.
Business necessity requires that the practice actually be—as the term implies—necessary to a
job’s function.58
In the context of orchestra auditions, job-relatedness should be easily satisfied: an
orchestra seeks to hire a skilled musician, hears a slate of candidates audition, and chooses the
player it deems the best fit for the ensemble. But, whether the practice is actually necessary for
the job is a harder question. Necessity raises more interesting questions. To determine whether a
practice meets the business necessity requirement, we must analyze the skills and qualifications

58

Previous scholarship has suggested that in the realm of casting and auditions, true necessity is not required, but
Title VII was amended in 1991 to explicitly require actual necessity. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e; Jennifer L. Sheppard, Theatrical Casting - Discrimination or Artistic Freedom?, 15
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that orchestra auditions assess, and whether that assessment is necessary to the orchestra’s
mission.
Those who ascribe to the “meritocracy” view of blind auditions typically argue that blind
auditions allow the hiring committee to choose the best candidate from the audition pool, solely
based on certain aural assessment criteria. But making a judgment about which candidate is the
best musician raises several distinct questions.
1. What skills are “necessary?”
First, what are the skills and qualities that make a musician the best candidate in an
audition pool? The blind audition purports to exclusively test a candidate’s musical abilities, and
choose the best candidate based on those criteria. And it is not hard to intuit that just like any
employer, orchestras seek to hire the best available applicant for an open position. To accomplish
this goal, orchestras have traditionally asked candidates to play a few excerpts, alone and in
isolation from musical context, to judge their musical abilities. Setting aside, for a moment, the
fact that performing orchestral passages in context can be vastly different from performing
excerpts in isolation, there is another, related question of whether a candidate’s ability to succeed
in this type of audition is predictive or representative of their ability to succeed on the job.
The excerpt list often draws from the standard canon and represents some of the most
commonly performed or most notorious passages on a given instrument. In analyzing a potential
business necessity defense and properly determining who is the “best” musician of a particular
group of candidates, organizations must consider whether a performance of these particular
excerpts, in this particular context accurately predicts who is the best candidate for the job.
Orchestral auditions, as they exist today, test one narrow subset of skills required to
succeed as a member of the orchestra. Because these auditions are such an isolated, narrowly16

informative process, they arguably do not test how well a musician will interact with colleagues
on stage—whether they will be a team player and be a good “fit” for the ensemble, nor do they
(generally) test how well and how quickly a candidate responds to instruction or feedback—a
crucial aspect of modern musicianship. Professional qualities include the same things important
in any other job candidate: reliability, professionalism, collegiality, adaptability, creativity,
leadership ability (especially in principal chairs), and more. In many, if not most, other
industries, even those featuring qualification-based hiring tests, an interview is also a critical
component of hiring decisions, and in that setting, a decisionmaker is able to assess some of
these “soft” but important skills that differentiate candidates.
Further, the orchestral field is increasingly competitive. Tommasini analogizes some
aspects of instrumental performance to athletics:
There is an athletic component to playing an instrument, and as with sprinters, gymnasts
and tennis pros, the basic level of technical skill among American instrumentalists has
steadily risen. A typical orchestral audition might end up attracting dozens of people who
are essentially indistinguishable in their musicianship and technique.
It’s like an elite college facing a sea of applicants with straight A’s and perfect
test scores. Such a school can move past those marks, embrace diversity as a social virtue
and assemble a freshman class that advances other values along with academic
achievement. For orchestras, the qualities of an ideal player might well include talent as
an educator, interest in unusual repertoire or willingness to program innovative chamber
events as well as pure musicianship. American orchestras should be able to foster these
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values, and a diverse complement of musicians, rather than passively waiting for
representation to emerge from behind the audition screen.59
If we take Tommasini at his word, we can draw two conclusions relevant to business necessity.
One conclusion is that if extramusical characteristics like pedagogical ability, passion for
innovation, and diversity are part of the broader modern American orchestra business model, an
isolated, dispositive test assessing only one small slice of an orchestral musician’s job
requirements cannot reasonably determine which candidate best fits a particular position. The
second, related conclusion is that where such extramusical qualifications should properly be
taken into account, and the best musician as defined by the current process may not be the same
candidate best fit for the day-to-day job requirements, such a narrow test may not be consistent
with business necessity.
2. Who defines the necessary skills, and how stringently?
But to assess whether these conditions remove blind auditions from the shield provided
by the business necessity defense, we must consider the how broadly or narrowly courts define
“necessity” in this context. Defining necessity raises interesting questions. First, who decides
what qualifications or skills are necessary for orchestra candidates to possess? Additionally, can
necessity be satisfied by a test that assesses only a small slice of how well a candidate will
perform their job responsibilities? Relatedly, is a hiring decision based almost exclusively on
which candidate performs best on such a narrowly tailored test necessary?
The Third Circuit helpfully articulated in Lanning v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. that
courts should examine that first question critically, noting that “a business necessity standard that
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wholly defers to an employer's judgment as to what is desirable in an employee therefore is
completely inadequate in combating covert discrimination based upon societal prejudices.”60 In
Lanning, the Third Circuit considered whether a relatively stringent aerobic fitness test was
necessary in evaluating candidates for SEPTA’s police force. The test established a cutoff score
which disparately and adversely affected women, and the court ruled that under Griggs, such a
discriminatory test only complies with Title VII in a disparate impact claim if it measures the
“minimum qualifications necessary” for successful job performance.61 In Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, the Court ruled that “discriminatory tests must be validated to show that they are
‘predictive of ... important elements of work behavior which comprise ... the job ... for which
candidates are being evaluated’ and that the scores of the higher-level employees do not
necessarily validate a cutoff score for the minimum qualifications to perform the job at an entry
level.”62 In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Court decided that “‘a discriminatory employment
practice,’ such as a discriminatory cutoff score on an entry level exam, ‘must be shown to be
necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge.’” Judge
Mansmann reasoned in Lanning that these two cases read in conjunction with Griggs show that
“the business necessity of a discriminatory cutoff score…must…measure[] the minimum
qualifications necessary” for successful job performance.63
An orchestral audition is certainly distinguishable from a law enforcement fitness test in a
variety of ways. Nonetheless, the “minimum qualifications necessary” standard can be
instructive. Indeed, as Tommasini notes, instrumental performance has elements of athleticism.
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That more physical side of music performance can be readily analogized to fitness tests like that
in Lanning. In the context of orchestral auditions, where orchestras generally have the luxury of
considering a “sea of [highly qualified] applicants,” and where the ultimate decision is made by
determining which candidate played the best audition, that candidate’s “score,” in effect,
becomes the “cutoff.” Not only does defining a cutoff this way create a moving target for
candidates, but where all of the top job candidates “are essentially indistinguishable in their
musicianship and technique[,]” an argument that a test that solely assesses musicianship and
technique, and perhaps not even completely, can hardly be said to measure the minimum
qualifications necessary for the position. Under this standard, a more tenable function for the
blind audition might be to assess the baseline standards—the “minimum” level of musicianship
the orchestra is willing to accept in a performer—and employ a “cutoff” at that point rather than
at the point of decision. Regardless, since the court rejected a “more is better” approach,
prohibiting employers from simply selecting the candidates who perform best on employment
tests, blind auditions as currently implemented may not comport with business necessity.64 The
reasons for prohibiting such an approach to hiring is amplified where the differences between the
top candidates’ performance on this “test” are at most marginally distinguishable,
3. What makes a skill “necessary” for orchestra musicians?
An employer may claim that it is a business necessity for them to hire the very best
candidate. And for many orchestras that historically feature a certain degree of prestige as part of
their allure, they may, understandably, wish to hire the single player who performs best at an
audition. However, there is a distinction between hiring the single “best” candidate based on
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factors consistent with an employer’s goals and determining whether a particular practice for
selecting the best candidate is consistent with the business necessity defense. This comment in
no way argues that orchestras, or any employers, should not have the freedom to select the best
candidate for a given job considering market pressures and consumer preferences.
The traditional orchestral business model was rooted in selecting the very finest
candidates for a job based on the narrow criteria an audition assesses. But, especially as
orchestras face more regular and severe financial difficulties, they have also recently sought to
broaden their programming to appeal to a broader audience base. As orchestras no longer adhere
to traditional classical programming and instead seek to present more modern and innovative
programs, it may be both preferable and more practical to assess candidates on how well they
perform a range of different styles, or on other factors like those discussed above, such as how
adaptable they may be.
Even if it is desirable for orchestras to hire based on pure musical skill, blind auditions as
they exist today may be a poor indicator of musicians’ relative abilities. Once the screen is gone,
and once the process is over, candidates will be assessed on a range of criteria that the current
system fails to address, which may include whether a candidate is a good team player, as well as
adaptability, professional responsibility, physical endurance, and creativity.65
All of those other qualities aside, assessing pure musicality in context is much different in
the audition and performance contexts. A blind audition assesses how well a candidate can
perform certain excerpts, in a very isolated way. The experience of playing in the orchestra, and
in a particular section is vastly different. It requires an awareness that performing an excerpt on
one’s own cannot replicate. It requires listening to the rest of the musicians on stage, and paying
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close attention to the conductor’s instructions, while maintaining focus on individual execution.
A blind audition merely tests how well a candidate performs the excerpt list, in a focused and
isolated manner—an experience that hardly replicates performing with the whole orchestra. And
even if a player has significant orchestra experience, each ensemble has its own unique sound,
feel, and style, and an isolated test is arguably a poor indicator of whether a candidate will be a
good fit for that particular orchestra. In sum, this process artificially isolates the individual in a
way that is not reflective of the job they seek.
Analyzing these various interactive pieces, Professor Balkin explains that “[t]he
performing arts … normally involve a triangle of performance.”66 This triangle consists of the
composer, the audience, and the performer; and it is the interaction between all three that give a
performance legitimacy.67 So, by isolating the candidate in an audition, the process diminishes
the influence of at least two points on the triangle.
In the orchestral audition, the composer is the most well-represented point on the triangle.
She has written her intentions on paper, and perhaps given guidance on how her work should be
interpreted. But, in orchestral music, the arbiter responsible for realizing the (often-deceased)
composer’s intentions is the conductor. He may or may not be present for the audition, but in a
normal setting he would inform players of his artistic interpretation and require them to adapt.
Blind auditions thus do not sufficiently capture the influence of the conductor and composer.
Illustrating the influential role of the composer, Antonín Dvořák wrote in 1893 in
conjunction with the premiere of his “New World” Symphony that “Black musical idioms should
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form the basis of an American classical style.”68 Around that same time, the American canon of
classical music began to take shape and orchestras began to form. Partially because of views like
Dvořák’s, and partially because of the relative youth of American music, many diverse cultures
exercised influence over the genre. Yet, early American audiences viewed composers from the
European tradition continued to as artistically superior and thus more popular.69 Yet, more
recently, audience tastes have begun to shift, and even in a largely-cancelled 2020-21 season,
orchestras’ “drastically reduced programs … contain a noticeable uptick in Black names.”70
Despite the audience’s importance, it is absent from the audition hall. The candidate
cannot react to or interact with audience members, and although historical accounts can provide
an indication of audience preferences, the role of the audience is also diminished in an orchestral
audition. Like the musicians on stage, orchestra audiences have been traditionally white.71 But as
preferences change, and as orchestras seek to serve audiences more representative of their
broader communities, they must recognize any consumer preference shifts that come with
marketing toward a different and more diverse subset of the population.72
The role of the performer is also limited. This point may seem counterintuitive, unless we
consider the relative context of the orchestral audition compared to performing in the orchestra.
Orchestras are often viewed as a unit or team—a singular entity working cohesively to present a
unified interpretation of a piece of music. If we invoke this collective definition of the term
“performer,” blind auditions strip away the influence of most members of the performing body.73
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All of this may seem like a criticism of the current audition process that is based on ideals
not practicable in the real world. After all, almost all hiring processes will to some degree lack
the ability to assess every aspect of the job at issue. And certainly, employers cannot be expected
to address every single possible facet of a particular job at the hiring stage, nor should they be
expected to go to painstaking lengths to do so. In many cases, an artificial approximation of job
requirements is the best an employer can do. However, when business necessity of a
discriminatory practice is at stake, Justice Burger warns in Griggs that “tests are useful servants,
but … they are not to become masters of reality.”74 Perhaps, then, a hiring process using blind
auditions as essentially dispositive, as a “master of reality,” is precisely the type of
discriminatory practice Griggs condemns.
C. Alternative Title VII Actions
Blind auditions are not the only hiring practice that bear upon diversity in the industry.
One other practice that might be challenged in a disparate impact action is the selection of the
labor pool from which candidates are drawn. A potential plaintiff could argue that inviting
candidates to audition from all over the globe with relatively little prescreening75 to determine
which of those candidates are truly competitive for the position, and requiring candidates to
attend the audition at their own (often significant) expense, only to participate in a highly
nontransparent process with very little odds of winning, is per se the type of structural
discrimination that Title VII is meant to prohibit through its disparate impact proof structure. If
such a case can be made, the business necessity defense is again implicated. And such an
indiscriminate invitation process could well be considered job-related, as orchestras wish to hear
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the maximum number of candidates from the broadest number of educational lineages and
traditions. But once again, the question of true “necessity” comes into play. Do orchestras truly
need to hear such a broad cross-section of available musicians? And considering the rest of the
processes involved with the blind audition system, do orchestras truly end up considering a
diverse slate of candidates by the final round?
The first question implicates some tricky realities surrounding pedagogical lineage in the
classical music sphere. As a preliminary matter, one must consider that orchestras are growing to
prefer an “increasingly homogenous sound concept.”76 This necessarily leads to a contraction in
orchestras’ stylistic preferences as they seek to recruit players who are steeped in musical
traditions that closely adhere to those players already in the section,77 and this contraction is only
catalyzed by wider availability of popular recordings on the internet and the increasing ease of
long-distance travel. It is also worth considering how the nature and relative competitiveness of
major orchestral auditions has changed over time.
Consider the perspective of Vincent Cichowicz, arguably the most influential modern
trumpet pedagogue:
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When I was growing up there were more players with an individual character.… If you
listen to orchestras now they all play wonderful[sic] but I miss the individuality.
Somebody like [former Boston Symphony Orchestra Principal Trumpet] Mager who had
this individual sound, didn’t sound like [New York Philharmonic Principal Trumpet]
Vacchiano or [subsequent Boston Symphony Orchestra Principal Trumpet] Ghitalla.
Today it seems like there is a general bureau of standards.78
Even these iconic musicians have noticed how the numerical realities have made these auditions
more competitive. Ghitalla noted that “[t]here were 25 players when I auditioned for the BSO job
in 1951. Ten years ago[,] there were 600 inquiries for a fourth trumpet job in the St. Louis
Symphony. They accepted about 175 tapes, and at least 60 players came…. No one was
chosen.”79 And Cichowicz has described how “[t]he audition process has become very
mechanistic because of the sheer numbers[,]” noting that a “lack of time to listen [leads to] not
getting the right player for the position.…There are real dangers in this practice. I am also upset
by occasional decisions not to accept any player….”80
A highly competitive process cannot automatically be labeled discriminatory and
exclusionary. Even if it were possible to eliminate all implicit and explicit bias from this process,
the field would still be left with the same number of qualified musicians in fierce competition for
the same number of roles. But the competitive nature of the process illustrates the importance of
nondiscriminatory decisionmaking practices that comply with Title VII where the barriers are so
high, the competition so intense, and where many of these positions will be occupied by an
audition winner for the rest of her career.
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Employers may, therefore, benefit by arguing the relevant labor market and qualified
applicant pool should be defined relatively narrowly, so that statistics may not show any
disparate impact on racial minorities because there are simply not enough qualified minority
candidates. This assumption requires analyzing how the qualified applicant pool should be
defined, a task which raises several questions.
First, what makes a candidate “qualified” for the job? Proponents of the system as it
exists today invoke the “meritocracy” argument discussed previously: that pure musical ability is
the sole characteristic upon which candidates are evaluated, and that other aspects of their
professional and personal identities should not and do not come into consideration. But, a
broader view may be more appropriate. As addressed above, there are other professional and
musical qualities that blind auditions, or perhaps auditions generally, do not address. The system
as it exists today is additionally vulnerable to criticism on the grounds that framing blind
auditions as a system that addresses pure musical ability is a flawed characterization.
A plausible argument exists that the (largely) historically static standards on which
orchestral musicians are judged are no longer appropriate for the 21st century. Audiences want
orchestras to modernize, and orchestra management has noticed. Orchestras are realizing that a
viable modern business model necessarily includes more diversified programming—arguably
both in terms of the musicians on stage and the types of music performed.
In considering how to best diversify their ensemble members and musical programming,
orchestras should evaluate the types of candidates they attract, compared to the relevant labor
market. For the purposes of this comment, it is impossible to examine the actual candidate pool
since orchestras do not collect racial data. Alternatively, we can consider racial demographics of
top music school graduates in the United States. Here, there may be an imbalance, as most top
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music schools seem to have more reasonably diverse student bodies.81 Additionally, those in the
field argue that there are plenty of qualified minority candidates prepared for orchestral jobs.82
The question then becomes: why are the ultimate audition winners so nondiverse?
Perhaps one issue is the cost and time barriers associated with traveling to and
performing even one audition. As noted above, a player must bear the cost of traveling to an
audition on his or her own, a cost which is often magnified for those who play physically large
instruments having to find a way to safely transport that instrument to an audition. But the cost of
taking an individual audition is far from the only structural barrier involved with reaching this
stage in one’s career. From a young age, a musician must take lessons from a professional on
their instrument. While private music lessons are expensive from any teacher, an aspiring
orchestral musician must find the right teachers—one well-versed in the orchestral tradition and
preferably from the predominant school of playing on that individual’s instrument, like the
Cichowicz-Butler-Geyer school of trumpet pedagogy. Finding such a teacher may come with
increased cost, but a knowledge barrier may also be present—a young musician must know
which teachers to study with and where to find them. Additionally, there can be significant cost
associated with actually acquiring professional-level instruments suitable for taking professional
auditions. Some instruments, like string instruments, French horns, harps, and reed instruments
require an investment of tens of thousands of dollars. Others, like the trumpet or flute are often
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more affordable, but require an investment in multiple instruments in different keys. None of this
may be obvious to a young student starting out in the field.
Another potential issue is that the audition process has not kept up with the increasing
diversification in orchestral programming. Auditions, as they exist today, largely test the same
collection of excerpts from the established canon—the “greatest hits” of the last 300 years.
While orchestras have obvious incentives to hire the best musician possible, we return to the
point that are the blind audition system falls short of distinguishing the “best” candidate. A
traditionally white, Eurocentric industry may have to adapt its definitions of what is actually
musically desirable if its goal is to increase diversity or to create orchestras that reflect the
communities around them. If orchestras truly seek to modernize, they must not only diversify the
musicians on stage but diversify the product they offer.
Evidence of this intent to modernize is reflected in, among other things, the many
“fusion” concerts we have seen cropping up over the last decade or programs geared toward a
younger crowd. Other forms of diversification could look like more interactive performances;
programs featuring more diverse soloists, conductors, and composers; concerts featuring new,
avant-garde compositions; or mixed-media performances.
Nonetheless, hiring in the same way as before, if the goal is to create new or more diverse
kinds of music, may not be consistent hiring the best-fitting musician for the modern orchestra.
The modern orchestra should seek out musicians who are adaptable and have experience in a
breadth of styles or musical traditions. In other words, orchestras must ask: is the musician who
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can best perform excerpts from Strauss’s Eine Alpensinfonie the same musician who is best
suited for a Drake fusion83 concert? If not, why do orchestras only test the former?
D. Alternative Practices
Even if an employer can prove business necessity, plaintiffs have one more opportunity
to defeat the challenged practice: by showing there is an alternative practice that can meet the
business objectives without adverse, discriminatory impact.84 In the realm of orchestral
auditions, a variety of alternative practices could potentially prove less discriminatory, and in
practice should not impose a significant burden on orchestras in administering auditions. This
section will explore some of the alternatives orchestras have to their current practices. Such
alternatives include various forms of affirmative action, a reconceptualization of the assessment
standards for orchestra candidates, initiatives to recruit more diverse candidates into the fold, and
educational programs to foster minority talent aimed at combatting these disparate statistics in
the long run.
1. Affirmative Action
Voluntary affirmative action policies that employers institute with the aim of remedying
racial imbalances in their workforces occupy a perennially controversial political space, and
additionally are subject to exacting legal scrutiny under Title VII. Despite this controversy,
prominent leaders in the music industry have voiced support for certain, limited affirmative
action initiatives. Esteemed conductor Leonard Slatkin argues that he is “not a fan of affirmative

83

Tchaikovsky Meets Drake at FUSE@PSO March 22 at Heinz Hall, PITTSBURGH SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA (Mar.
18, 2017).
84
See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).

30

action,” but that it can be beneficial to, all else being equal, hire “the person who brings the
potential to inspire other minorities to the stage” because “[t]he candidate of color contributes
added value by bringing the orchestra a step closer to reflecting the diverse community it serves,
which will ultimately lead to a stronger and more sustainable organization.”85
Justice Brennan’s opinion in United Steelworkers v. Weber upheld the implementation of
voluntary affirmative action plans, as long as such programs meet three requirements: that the
plan remedies traditional patterns of discrimination, that the plan does not unduly trammel the
interests of applicants or employees who are not its intended beneficiaries, and that the plan is
will only be active temporarily until the pattern of discrimination has been eliminated.86 A few
years later, the Court upheld an affirmative action plan which authorized consideration of
ethnicity or sex.87 Brennan clarified that under Weber, Title VII did not prohibit an employer
considering sex for purposes of promotion.88
Conductor Leonard Slatkin has proposed a potential form of affirmative action labeled
the “Slatkin Audition Process.”89 In the Slatkin Audition Process, first, “[a]ll applicants submit
their CVs for consideration as has been the usual method.”90 A blind preliminary round then
takes place, either virtually or live, followed by “a round of in-person semi-finals … without the
presence of the music director[,]” and without a screen.91 After this semifinal round, Slatkin
proposes that orchestras hold “no finals in the traditional sense[,]” but instead invite each
remaining candidate “to play with the orchestra for four weeks.…so that [musicians can] express
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an opinion ….”92 Then, after each candidate has a trial period, a “final decision is reached
between the leader of the section in question and the music director[] ….”93 Slatkin argues this
practice can help diversity as “a decision can be made in favor of a candidate who represents an
underserved community if … that the player’s musicianship is on par with the others being
considered.”94 Slatkin notes that his proposal is imperfect, but believes it could “encourag[e]
more persons of color not to give up because of the process.”95
It is certainly true that Slatkin’s process remedies traditional patterns of discrimination as
the Weber test requires, and if it is only instituted on a temporary basis—perhaps until those
“underserved” communities are no longer underserved, the remaining issue is whether the plan
would “unduly trammel” opportunities for white candidates. As an illustration, if the orchestra
chooses a Black candidate because of his race, as Slatkin suggests, a reviewing court would have
to consider whether race was the dispositive factor in the decisionmaking process, that
necessarily excluded from consideration the other, non-Black candidates. If an orchestra is
considered to have made this decision because of race, it may impermissibly and “unduly
trammel” opportunities for other candidates, especially since open orchestra roles are so rare. But
this issue can also be framed differently. Justice Brennan clarified his position in Weber in
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal. a few years later, ruling that where
“[s]even … applicants were classified as qualified and eligible, and the [decisionmaker] was
authorized to promote any of the seven[,]” it was appropriate for the employer to take the sex of
candidates into account as one factor among many in the hiring process without unsettling any
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“legitimate, firmly rooted expectation on the part of” other candidates.96 Still, we note that
Justice Brennan did not hold that sex, race, or any other protected characteristic can be the
dispositive factor in a hiring decision.
In evaluating whether Slatkin’s plan would be permissible under current U.S. affirmative
action doctrine,97 it is helpful to import the reasoning from two 2003 Supreme Court decisions,
Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger. In Grutter, Justice O’Connor affirmed Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, ruling that affirmative action plans which consider race as a
“plus factor” in higher education admissions processes are permissible.98 In Gratz, the Court held
that a point-based evaluation which prefers certain minority candidates is impermissible if
functions as “guaranteeing” admission to all minimally-qualified minority applicants.99
O’Connor clarified in concurrence that the policy should be eliminated because it mechanically
selected minority applicants without meaningful individualized review.100
On which side of this distinction would a plan like Slatkin’s fall? On one hand, Slatkin’s
process seems to thoroughly evaluate candidates at a number of stages before making an ultimate
decision between a handful of highly qualified candidates, and accordingly could be viewed as
using race as a potential “plus factor” at the discretion of the ultimate decisionmaker.
Alternatively, one could view the process as an impartial process up until the point of the
ultimate decision, which is made—just like the effect of the point system in Gratz—using race as
a dispositive factor. However, this system is not entirely mechanistic and quantitative like that in
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Gratz. There is a certain degree of discretion granted to the decisionmaker in this proposed
audition process, and perhaps the crux of the process’s potential legality would turn on how
much of that discretion a decisionmaker chose to exercise—whether she used race as a
dispositive factor in choosing between finalists, or went through a thorough and holistic review
of each candidate’s qualifications, fit, and abilities. In other words, legality could hinge not on
the ultimate result of the decision but in the factors relied upon to reach it.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano complicates the analysis further. At issue
in Ricci was a test used by the New Haven Fire Department to determine which candidates
should be promoted. The Department “threw out” the test results because they disparately and
adversely affected Black candidates, but the Court ruled that the Department’s decision to cast
these results aside violated Title VII, because despite the test’s disparate impact, the action
constituted intentional discrimination against white candidates. The Court explained that racebased actions are impermissible under Title VII unless employer can “demonstrate a strong basis
in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact
statute.”
A shift from the blind audition to processes flexible enough to allow race-conscious
hiring could be considered the type of race-based action that Ricci prohibits, and orchestras
instituting such plans would therefore have to provide a “strong basis in evidence” that not
instituting some form of race-conscious affirmative action would leave them liable to a Title VII
disparate impact suit. As discussed above, many complexities arise in bringing a disparate
impact suit. Potential plaintiffs would have to defeat a showing of business necessity, and as we
will discuss infra, a disparate impact suit could likely be defeated on First Amendment grounds.
Accordingly, an explicitly race-based affirmative action plan may not survive a Title VII
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challenge alleging intentional discrimination. Nonetheless, this comment will explore below how
the employer’s same First Amendment defenses in a disparate impact suit could shield
affirmative action plans from being struck down.
Slatkin’s process is certainly not the only possible path for orchestras who wish to
implement some form of affirmative action. Perhaps taking affirmative steps earlier in the
audition process could provide a middle ground between a mechanism that arguably allows racebased decisionmaking, and the nominal and ineffectual steps the industry has taken thus far
toward creating a less discriminatory process.
2. Recruiting Diverse Candidates
Another potential solution is to affirmatively select a certain number of presumptively
qualified, racially diverse candidates at the preliminary stage and automatically advance them to
the semifinal round of the audition—whether blind or not—where they would compete with the
rest of the candidates advanced through the typical process. This could ensure that more minority
candidates are heard, and do not face the initial challenge of trying to distinguish themselves
from a sea of candidates, many of whom are nearly identical to a blind adjudicator. At the same
time, such a procedure would not be vulnerable to a challenge for “guaranteeing” a particular
spot to a minority candidate as the Gratz Court prohibited.101
Another idea is to screen more candidates at the pre-audition stage through increased use
of recorded prescreening tapes, with the aim of inviting fewer candidates to the live audition.
Although this would limit the number of candidates considered in live auditions, it is not an
opportunity-limiting device. The point of this proposal is to more scrupulously choose which
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candidates to invite, focusing on those who would genuinely be a good fit for the position. The
candidates who audition live would thus have a statistically improved chance of winning the
audition—which is important if, as we have considered above, the cost and time barriers
associated with taking a live, blind audition can be prohibitively expensive in many cases, and in
ways that disproportionately impact qualified minority candidates. And, because auditions in
their current form are often considered a “numbers game” by candidates (a musician will rarely,
if ever, win their first audition, and will have to gain experience auditioning to find success),
minimizing the unlikelihood of success in live auditions can help all candidates efficiently
maximize their preparation.
3. Implementing Nondiscriminatory Standards
Both of the aforementioned proposals allow orchestras to preserve the same criteria on
which they make their final decision—the purportedly objective assessment of each finalist’s
musical and technical prowess. Whether such assessments are consistent with nondiscriminatory
goals is an open question. There is certainly an argument that they allow orchestras to preserve
artistic integrity and shape their stylistic visions. But there is also an argument that such a
solution does not address underlying biases—that effectively requiring minority candidates to
conform to these traditional and increasingly uniform artistic standards erases the benefit of
cross-cultural exchange that should come hand-in-hand with an institution’s workforce
diversification.
Addressing this issue requires discussing whether antidiscrimination law should confront
those underlying biases. At the heart of this debate are two differing theories of
antidiscrimination law. The anticlassification approach ascribes to a “colorblind” view of
equality, aptly articulated by Justice Roberts in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
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Seattle School District No. 1: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”102 Proponents of this view believe that individuals should
not be differentiated based on their race—often even in the context of affirmative action
programs—and believe, like the proponents of the “meritocracy” justification for blind auditions,
that the most qualified candidate should always prevail, regardless of his or her identity. This
view has been a useful sword for combatting intentional discrimination, but often declines to
recognize structural harms to minority groups as a whole, and more subtle, structural forms of
discrimination.
Alternatively, the antisubordination approach focuses on discriminatory effects of actions
or policies on minority groups, and is more consistent with recognizing group-level, structural
harms regardless of discriminatory intent.103 This view is more consistent with recognizing the
underlying biases that traditional affirmative action may not address. An antisubordination
approach allows us to explore how an employer’s evaluative standards can contribute to a
cyclical lack of diversity and continue to “subordinate” minority candidates who may not have
access to the “elite” educational institutions an orchestral career often requires. It also allows us
to explore how divergent educational paths lead to these disparities, and consider potential
solutions at the formative stages of a musician’s training.
Discussing first the bias associated with the standards used to evaluate orchestra
candidates, the audition system may be vulnerable in part because an audition does not predict
nor closely approximate the skills and capabilities necessary for successful job performance.
Additionally, however, these standards themselves may have inherent discriminatory biases.
Orchestras may wish, for artistic reasons, to preserve the European tradition on which they were
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founded (though even this is a questionable premise as orchestral composers have historically
borrowed from other musical and artistic traditions). But in the face of globalization and recent
calls for social change, orchestras have begun to recognize the need to diversify the musicians
they place on stage, and have begun to reconcile this aim with realizing a sustainable business
model. Increasingly, orchestras present fusion concerts which meld together the classical
tradition with popular musical genres, invite diverse composers and soloists to headline their
concert programming, and present performances in innovative new styles that are a marked
departure from their standard canon. Considering these seismic artistic shifts, such a narrowly
constrained hiring process may no longer be appropriate. Especially in light of the increasing
stylistic homogeneity discussed previously, orchestras should consider reversing course,
diversifying not just the musicians they hire but the styles and capabilities they emphasize in the
audition process. In 2021, the demands on a full-time orchestra musician are broader than ever
before in terms of style, technique, and creativity. It no longer seems prudent to maintain the
narrow standards of the past half-century, and broadening audition criteria could help orchestras
find the most talented musician in light of all of their programming. That musician might just
happen to be diverse.
4. Education
Another proposed method that has been put forth as a means to increase diversity is
addressing the educational system that trains musicians. Some in the industry argue that the
talent pipeline is the true issue—that minority candidates simply are not qualified enough. As we
have touched on above, there may very well be a problem with the minority candidate pipeline
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and its accessibility in classical music. The premise that there are not enough qualified minority
musicians, however, is well-rebutted by leaders in music education.104
Nonetheless, orchestras and music education organizations have implemented programs
to increase access to quality music education. Over the past forty years, many of the top major
orchestras have created “fellowships” for Black and Latino musicians to give those players
training in a top orchestra and to diversify the ranks of the ensemble.105 And over that same
period of time, groups such as the Sphinx Organization and the New World Symphony have
created assistance funds to increase equity in accessing auditions. Despite this relatively long arc
of professional assistance initiatives, racial diversity in orchestras remains static.
There are also initiatives that seek to address disparities earlier in a musician’s training. It
is generally true that musical training should begin relatively early in one’s life if they are to
reach a professional competency level. Therefore, the available training in a musician’s
precollegiate years can be critical to long-term success. But, access to these types of programs,
perhaps unsurprisingly, is unequal. “[O]rchestral training is offered in approximately only 20
percent of American public schools, with the large majority of these programs being located in
suburban schools.”106 Often, too, such inequalities begin even earlier in a student’s life.
Musicologist Anne Shreffler describes the typical collegiate music curriculum, noting that “[w]e
relied on students showing up on our doorstep having had piano lessons since the age of six.”107
And, “[g]iven the systemic inequality into which many people of color are born, this ‘class-based
implicit requirement’ … becomes a covert form of racial exclusion.”108
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Nonetheless, extracurricular programs, often based on the success of El Sistema109 in
Venezuela, have been relatively successful in filling this opportunity gap where such programs
are available. Perhaps expanding programs like these is the sustainable solution to complement
any necessarily temporary affirmative action plan. The Supreme Court has noted that over time,
nondiscriminatory hiring practices “will in time result in a work force more or less representative
of the population in the community from which employees are hired.”110 Affirmative action may
be one way to accomplish that goal now, but to achieve long-term diversity, the classical music
field should seek to improve educational equity. And while both of these efforts represent worthy
goals, industry leaders should not ignore the lesson taken from antisubordination theory: that
hiring more diverse musicians is an incomplete means to serve a diverse community if such
efforts do not come alongside a cultural and artistic diversification of the final product an
orchestra offers.
E. The First Amendment Defense
Regardless of any alternative, less-discriminatory practices, employers may have a strong
First Amendment defense to a disparate impact claim. Setting aside potentially viable business
necessity and “qualifications” defenses, employers whose products constitute a form of
“expression” often have a right to make casting decisions as they see fit, and are granted
significant discretion in doing so. As Professor Robinson has noted, “the First Amendment
requires treating casting decisions with a degree of deference that Title VII would not ordinarily
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afford employers[.]”111 The First Amendment does not exempt employers from
antidiscrimination regulations if the action at issue is commercial speech that encourages
discrimination, such as a “Female Help Wanted” sign112 or a “White Applicants Only”
advertisement,113 as those are considered conduct, not content, regulations.114 However, where
the regulated discriminatory “speech” is something less explicit, the analysis is more
complicated.
First, it is necessary to determine whether Title VII’s effects on speech are content-based,
either facially or as-applied, or content-neutral, as that will dictate the level of scrutiny the statute
and its application would have to overcome.115 Generally, content-based regulations must pass
strict scrutiny while content-neutral restrictions are subjected to the more lenient intermediate
scrutiny standard.116 In a landmark decision, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court ruled
that laws that are “facially content neutral[] will be considered content-based regulations of
speech: laws that cannot be ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ or
that were adopted by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech]
conveys,’” must overcome strict scrutiny.117
What, if anything, does an orchestra “say” by blindly hiring a new musician? By hiring
blindly, the orchestra necessarily chooses a candidate without considering race as an explicit
factor.
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On this view, it is difficult to call any application of Title VII content-based, as it is
difficult to implicate the content of the regulated speech in the restriction’s justification. Where
the regulation prohibits racial and other types of discrimination, and the regulated content is,
depending on whose theory of the First Amendment we invoke, either hiring the single “best”
musician or hiring the musician who best fits with the overall artistic goal of the ensemble, there
is virtually no definition upon which the Title VII’s justification, the government interest in
eradicating racial discrimination, bears upon the content of the speech it regulates in this case.118
Thus, even as-applied, Title VII would here be considered a content-neutral regulation
warranting intermediate scrutiny, and likely passing that scrutiny.
To survive intermediate scrutiny, a restriction must simply be “justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech,” which we have determined it likely is, and be “narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, … leav[ing] open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.”119 Title VII, by its own virtue, represents a
significant governmental interest, as indicated by its various amendments and judicial
affirmances, and as we have discussed, the protections, exceptions, and defenses both written
into the statute and granted by the courts create at least a plausible suggestion that the statute is
narrowly tailored. In sum, the fact that auditions are conducted blindly may allow the orchestra
to assert the “meritocracy” argument in support of the claim that, unlike an employment decision
that is made because of and with full knowledge of a candidate’s race, no discriminatory conduct
occurs in the typical blind audition.120
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Yet, an alternative understanding of the blind audition process may implicate strict
scrutiny. Considering the disparities that this process creates or perpetuates in the musician
workforce, it seems possible that as applied, Title VII’s requirements regulate content. Because
the industry’s lack of diversity is well-known and widely discussed,121 perhaps a more practical
understanding of blind auditions and Title VII is that the regulation, which prohibits racial
discrimination, does in fact regulate the content of the speech at issue, because American
orchestras are well aware of the racial disparities, yet continually elect to hire in a way that
perpetuates these disparities.
One might wonder if Justices of the current Supreme Court would be amenable to this
framing of the issue. In Bostock v. Clayton County, Justice Gorsuch wrote that “[b]y
intentionally setting out a rule that makes hiring turn on race or religion, the employer violates
the law, whatever he might know or not know about individual applicants.”122 Along similar
lines, if an orchestra knows their blind hiring practices have discriminatory effects, and
“studiously avoids”123 learning the race or any other identifying factor of the candidate they are
hiring until late in the process, could they similarly violate Title VII’s prohibitions on those
grounds?
Where this is the case, it is then perhaps possible to characterize the current blind hiring
process as not only aimed at hiring the best musician, but doing so with knowing disregard for
the racial disparities that process either creates or preserves. This implicates the characterization
of the “speech” an orchestra promulgates through its hiring practices. Justifying a particular
application of a racial discrimination law, in that case, may well be impossible without
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mentioning the racially discriminatory hiring practice. Under Reed, such an understanding would
trigger a much tougher strict scrutiny analysis.
The practical difference between the strict and intermediate scrutiny standards is far more
than semantics.124 Recent Supreme Court decisions have almost always invalidated contentbased regulations under strict scrutiny, and rarely invalidated content-neutral regulations.125
In our hypothetical disparate impact case, two possible outcomes may lead to divergent
tiers of scrutiny. On one hand, orchestras could argue that unlike a film casting decision that is
typically made because of and with full knowledge of an actor’s race, no discriminatory conduct
occurs in blind auditions. Under this view, race is not implicated in decisionmaking, and the
regulations receives intermediate scrutiny. On the other hand, the argument could be framed
around the fact that American orchestras are well aware of existing racial disparities, yet
continually hire in a way that perpetuates these disparities, perhaps because they have assessed
artistic integrity to be more valuable than a diverse workforce. Under this view, any justification
of a Title VII application is necessarily content-referential, triggering strict scrutiny under Reed.
If indeed true that framing this same issue in two different lights can trigger different tiers
of scrutiny, it is also worth examining the justifications behind the various forms of “speech” the
First Amendment protects.
A. What content is protected?
Any analysis must start with defining the protected “speech” interest at issue, and which
components of an artistic product fall within the First Amendment’s sphere. In Hurley, the Court
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focused on a decisionmaker’s discretion to choose which messages are associated with its name,
refusing to grant “any contingent of protected individuals with a message [] the right to
participate in petitioners' speech.”126 Similarly, in Dale, the Court was concerned that
accommodating a gay Boy Scout leader would unduly burden the Scouts’ “ability to advocate
public or private viewpoints.”127 Neither of these two rationales are helpful here—it would be
strange to argue that blindly hiring a musician based purely on “merits” and irrespective of
identity would hamper an orchestra’s particular viewpoint, if they have an articulable viewpoint
at all. And, as discussed, choosing a musician in an orchestra is not so much granting them a
platform for their own message as much as choosing an employee who best fits the orchestra’s
expressive goals.128
Although possible that an orchestra selects a candidate based on that candidate’s
particular artistic viewpoint, this argument leads to two issues. First, under Reed’s contentreferencing justification framework, defining the protected speech as something other than
identity-based likely removes the application of Title VII from strict scrutiny. Second, as we will
discuss below, current First Amendment precedent does not provide a satisfactory premise from
which to assess an artistic viewpoint.
B. Art & First Amendment Theory
Art, construed broadly to include performance arts, has long been considered as being
within the First Amendment’s coverage of speech and expression.129 While the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence has been clear that “art is within the First Amendment's coverage,” Professor
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Adler notes that “it is difficult to find a satisfactory rationale to justify that assumption within
existing First Amendment theory.”130 “[T]he predominant rationale for protecting speech under
the First Amendment is the fabled metaphor of ‘the marketplace of ideas[,]’” which values
speech for its “rationally comprehensible ideas,” making it challenging to characterize art as
protected under the First Amendment’s umbrella.131 Adler argues, “[i]t would be a reductive and
cramped reading of … art to suggest that the point of [a piece] is to express an idea.”132
The Court’s First Amendment cases, broadly, have granted protection to forms of
expression including art, parades, music, drama, movies, and television133 Professor Chen argues
that instrumental music is no exception.134 However, to understand why the Court so
unquestionably protects art, particularly its nonverbal subcategories including visual art and
instrumental music, under the First Amendment despite maintaining the “marketplace of ideas”
approach as its primary justification for protecting speech, it is helpful to consider what little
relevant justification the Court has given. In Hurley, the Court determined that Jackson Pollack’s
art and Arnold Schöenberg’s (purely instrumental) music were both “unquestionably shielded”
by the First Amendment, reasoning that trying to find a “succinctly articulable” message was not
required, because such a requirement would make it difficult to reconcile the “marketplace of
ideas” approach with artistic protections.135
Like Adler, Chen notes that “[r]ather than engaging in a careful or thoughtful
consideration of music as speech, the Court has instead made superficial assumptions and
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conveyed lofty, unquestioning platitudes.”136 Chen notes the three cases in which the Court has
concluded that music is expressive, protected speech, but in all of those cases the Court omitted
any analysis of whether the musical components of those performances were themselves
protected and which particular components of a musical performance, if any, received First
Amendment coverage.137 One of the most thorough judicial justifications for classifying music as
speech worthy of First Amendment protection is found in Miller v. Civil City of South Bend,
where the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, decided that music need not have a particular
intellectual message or appeal to warrant First Amendment coverage.138 Judge Posner wrote in
concurrence that music need not be propositional to be considered speech, otherwise
instrumental music would generally receive less protection than nude dancing, explaining that
under such an approach, “Beethoven's string quartets are entitled to less protection than Peter
and the Wolf.”139 Judge Easterbrook dissented, arguing that nude dancing was distinguishable
from instrumental music.140 Easterbrook wrote:
“People may fairly dispute whether absolute music,141 such as LaMonte Young's WellTuned Piano, communicates thoughts, but surely it embodies them (the right place for the
major third, etc.); all that we call music is the product of rational human thought and
appeals at least in part to the same faculties in others. It has the "capacity to appeal to the
intellect," … is not "conduct," and is closer to speech (even an emotional harangue is
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speech) than to smashing a Ming vase or kicking a cat, two other ways to express
emotion.”142
Though they disagreed on the case’s merits, the two judges helped rationalize instrumental music
as a form of expression covered under the First Amendment.
C. The First Amendment and Affirmative Action
While the First Amendment may prove fatal to a potential plaintiff’s Title VII disparate
impact suit challenging orchestral audition processes, so too might it defeat the threats posed by
potential disparate treatment suits to voluntary remedial affirmative action plans. It is thus
possible that protected artistic freedom allows an employer significant discretion over hiring
processes absent a showing that the speech at issue encourages discrimination. Because
affirmative action generally constitutes a race-based, race-justified action, any affirmative action
challenge under Title VII would likely implicate strict scrutiny under Reed, granting orchestraemployers significant discretion to tailor appropriate affirmative action policies should they so
choose.
Professor Robinson argues that in the film context, the First Amendment should not be a
blanket defense against Title VII liability, but illustrates that in certain cases, like period pieces,
“filmmakers … should not have to cast actors whose racial identity might be unrealistic given
the historical setting.”143 Robinson applies that argument to depictions of well-known figures
like Malcolm X, but also to general populations to ensure accurate historical depictions.144 Just
like a film’s decision to cast in a racially-accurate way, the First Amendment should protect an
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orchestra’s reasonable initiatives to hire in a manner that diversifies its membership to reflect the
community it serves. If an orchestra has an interest in “depicting” or “representing” the diversity
of the surrounding community, and if the First Amendment can, in some cases, permit the
orchestra to continue discriminatory hiring practices, it should allow the employer similar
deference with an appropriately-tailored affirmative action plan.145
III.

Implications
This exploration of antidiscrimination law’s applicability to the orchestral hiring process

leaves several open questions for further analysis. First, the application of debiasing technology
in the form of blind auditions raises normative questions about the proper aims of
antidiscrimination law and policy, and whether “debiased” hiring should be a goal in itself, or
like the Court has required of traditional affirmative action, a crutch employers temporarily rely
on to catalyze the creation of a more diverse workforce. Second, the analysis of a potential Title
VII disparate impact suit challenging the status quo in orchestral audition procedures illustrates
some of the civil rights statute’s potential shortcomings. Considering Title VII’s goals and the
state of employment discrimination today, legislative or jurisprudential shifts may be necessary
to more fully recognize structural discrimination and realize an appropriately diverse workforce.
A. Debiasing Technologies
The blind audition occupies a curious space in combatting discrimination. The data show
that blind auditions have proven a useful tool to remedy gender inequality in orchestral hiring.
But while the gender imbalance has stabilized at the hiring stage, is it really fair to say that the
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implementation removed bias from the process? Perhaps the blind audition simply shifts existing
biases—conscious or unconscious—to other phases of education, recruitment, hiring, and
eventually, employment itself.
One way to view the blind audition is as a tool that does not remove bias from the
process, but merely removes a candidate’s identity, the foundation of that bias, from
consideration. Even confining this analysis to gender disparities, while blind auditions arguably
eliminated gender imbalances in orchestral hiring, examining other phases in the pre- and posthiring timeline prove that certain gender disparities persist. At the education and training phase
of a musician’s career, statistics show that certain instruments are considered stereotypically
“male” or “female” in ways that affect imbalances from the “pre-conservatoire” to professional
stages.146 We additionally observe that on the job, women’s tenure is, on average, about 14% less
than their male counterparts.147 Men occupy 83.2% of principal, and 64.82% of assistant or
associate principal chairs.148 And, women face the same pay equity issues in orchestras as in so
many other industries.149
In light of these realities, perhaps the blind audition is not so much a de-biasing tool,
rather a bias-shifting mechanism. The gender shift facilitated by blind auditions is a significant
step toward equity, but it is also an incomplete remedial measure. Scholars like Professor Leong
have noted that in implementing debiasing technologies in other industries, “while the face-toface interaction that sometimes triggers bias does still occur with [debiased hiring technology], it
occurs at a much later stage.”150 Leong explains that, for example, “[p]ast the hiring stage,
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technological interventions can also affect the evaluation of people who hold a particular job.”151
So, debiasing at the early stages risks simply pushing discrimination issues further down the
employment timeline to the point when the candidate joins the workforce.152 Studies of “ban-thebox” laws—essentially “debiasing” laws which prohibit employers from asking about criminal
history in initial job applications—illustrate the reality that employers “would rather call back a
white applicant with a known criminal record than a black applicant whose criminal record was
unknown.”153 Accordingly, where debiasing in multiple contexts failed to facilitate diverse
hiring, perhaps the utility of these seemingly meritocratic systems should be reassessed.
Still, debiasing the early hiring process bolsters the argument that a blind audition system
is a pure meritocracy—a system that strips away a candidate’s identity to focus purely on their
musical capabilities.154 This approach is consistent with an anticlassification view of
antidiscrimination law’s goals.155
Nonetheless, as Leong suggests, debiasing through blind auditions may simply push the
point of discrimination later in the employment timeline. But beyond that, blind auditions may
shift bias from overt, discriminatory acts (whether intentional or not), to subtler, more
impersonal decisions built into the hiring process, easily defended as artistic preferences, and
thus better shielded from the reach of antidiscrimination law.
While such technologies are not necessarily incompatible with longer-term goals, a real
worry exists that screening technologies may be viewed as sufficient, rather than simply helpful,
in rooting out discrimination.156 “[O]ne problem with [debiasing] technology that makes us blind
151
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to race is that it also potentially makes us blind to racial bias and how much racial bias is out
there.”157
Considering the other gender equity issues that persist in the orchestra, and the racial
imbalances this comment has discussed thoroughly above, Leong’s conclusion, more consistent
with antisubordination theory, is persuasive that in this context, “the overarching priority [should
be] simply that we do think about the decisions we make, and that we do not simply head blindly
into a misinformed attempt at race-blindness.”158 Even outside the legal realm, recruitment
professionals have begun to notice the potential shortcomings with debiasing methods. As one
professional recruiter argues, “[t]hose who can set biases aside while hiring based on
qualifications and experience, as well as some element of uniqueness or diversity the candidate
brings to the workplace, will achieve or exceed the benefits of blind hiring.”159
If orchestras are to truly eradicate impermissible biases in a lawful and meaningful way, they
should consider the other subtle, structural, and implicit biases previously discussed, whether or
not the blind audition is here to stay.
B. Title VII’s Shortcomings
These issues illustrate significant shortcomings in Title VII’s goal of promoting equal
employment opportunities. Title VII jurisprudence recognizes that over time, nondiscriminatory
hiring practices “will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the population
in the community from which employees are hired.”160 But this is not yet the reality in many
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fields, and the peculiarities of the American orchestra’s hiring practices illustrate some of the
many barriers to workforce diversity that Title VII does not adequately address.
As discussed, the First Amendment may pose a bar to disparate impact suits against
orchestra-employers in many, if not all cases. While it may also be true that employers may
invoke that same First Amendment freedom of speech and artistic discretion to shield voluntary
affirmative action from judicial intervention, voluntary affirmative action is just that—voluntary.
It must be an affirmative step that the employer takes to remedy traditional patterns of
discrimination in its workforce, and cannot be a step compelled by candidates who allege they
were treated unfairly in the hiring process. Instituting such a policy could spark significant
backlash and debate, so orchestras may be discouraged from doing so, instead opting to continue
the largely harmless yet unproductive “diversity” initiatives they have experimented with over
the past forty years. This legal landscape grants employers too much discretion and job-seekers
insufficient protection. If an orchestra is free to continue structural forms of discrimination, and
for the same reason cannot be compelled to institute affirmative remedial hiring procedures, Title
VII is left toothless in combating arguably the most prevalent form of discrimination today—
discrimination that comes in the form of unintentional, structural, or subtle ways; that cannot be
directly attributed to discriminatory animus; and that disproportionately affects disadvantaged
minority populations United States law should address this problem by more appropriately
reconciling First Amendment and Title VII protections in a way that does not so heavily favor
employers. Perhaps this is best achieved by, as Robinson suggests in the film context, stringently
limiting the applicability of First Amendment defenses to those cases where artistic integrity is
truly at stake.161
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Existing law has its tradeoffs of—it may essentially act as a shield for both employers
who continue historical discriminatory trends and those who attempt to remedy them. If hiring
decisions are deemed to content-affecting, the First Amendment could undercut the viability of
voluntary affirmative action in orchestral hiring. Yet, if hiring decisions are categorized as noncontent-altering acts—acts that do not interfere with artistic integrity—the First Amendment may
not bar voluntary affirmative action plans. Perhaps, then, existing law is a better—even if less
concrete and immediate—method for combating discrimination in orchestral hiring, as opposed
to codifying certain employers’ discretion to discriminate based on race.
IV.

Conclusion
The intersection of antidiscrimination law and the First Amendment with the current and

proposed states of orchestral musician hiring present interesting and complex normative and
legal questions. The current legal landscape affords no clear solution to the diversity problem in
American orchestras, but the blind audition status quo as well as proposed reforms each offer
distinct benefits and challenges. This comment does not advocate a single path forward, rather
seeks to provide an overview of the various factors weighing for and against each approach, with
an eye toward helping American orchestras achieve greater racial diversity in a manner
consistent with a sustainable business model. This comment also seeks to analyze these issues
under current antidiscrimination law to provide both insight that is applicable across a range of
industries, and to illustrate the discrepancies between the goals of Title VII and the scope of the
legal force it actually wields in practice. While this complex area of law leaves no clear answers,
it should encourage employers to think critically about the goals their employment policies
actually accomplish, and encourage courts to consider the full effect of policies challenged
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before them in a way not only consistent with current antidiscrimination jurisprudence, but also
respectful of the goals Title VII originally sought to accomplish.
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